Encryption is not the question

Cryptomator is built around one promise: encrypt a folder on your device, sync the ciphertext to the cloud provider you already use, and keep that provider from seeing your files.

So this comparison isn't about who encrypts better. It's about what each app is actually protecting you from.

Encrypting a folder vs. protecting a person

Cryptomator's unit of work is the vault-as-folder: create a vault inside a Dropbox or Google Drive folder, mount it, and everything you drop in gets encrypted before it syncs. It is built for one worry: a cloud provider seeing plaintext.

It's a different design from "someone is asking me to unlock my phone right now." Cryptomator has no separate code that opens a decoy vault or wipes anything — the closest it gets is that you can make as many vaults as you like, but none of them are built to be shown under pressure or destroyed on command.

Vaultine's Decoy Vault opens on a second code and shows a vault you stocked in advance with harmless files. The Duress Vault opens on a third code, shows an empty vault, and wipes your real vaults as it does. Once it has, that vault becomes your main vault, so there is no empty shell left sitting there to explain. Both are deliberate, prepared-in-advance features, not an emergent property of "you can make more than one vault."

What its own reviewers report

Cryptomator's most common recent complaint, by a wide margin, is the vault failing to open — sync errors, authentication loops with the Files app, blank screens after an update. That tracks with the app's design: it leans on the OS's file-provider integration to make an encrypted vault behave like a normal folder, and that integration layer is exactly what broke for a third of recent negative reviewers.

A smaller but sharper theme: file thumbnails staying visible in the Files app for a moment after the vault was supposedly locked. That's the specific risk of routing decrypted content through a general-purpose file browser rather than a dedicated viewer.

Vaultine's answer to both is structural. There's no file-provider layer to break, because the vault opens inside the app. And the built-in viewer means photos, videos and PDFs are never handed to Finder, the Files app, or their thumbnail caches — they open and stay inside Vaultine.